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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In addition to the statutory provisions set forth in the
opening brief of appellant Park City Education Association
("PCEA"), we rely on Utah Code Ann. ("UCA") § 53A-8-103(1), which
reads as follows:
A local school board shall, by contract with its
educators or their associations or by resolution of the
board, establish procedures for dismissal of educators
in an orderly manner without discrimination.

ARGUMENT
The question in this case is whether appellee Board of
Education of the Park City School District ("Board") was
obligated, pursuant to the 1988-1990 Master Contract between the
Board and PCEA, to provide health insurance coverage during the
1989-90 school year for all members of the bargaining unit,
including part-time teachers Nancy Schulthess and Margery Hadden.
In our opening brief ("PCEA Br."), we demonstrated that the
answer to this question is yes.

Specifically, we explained why

the trial court erred when it held that paragraph 2.3 of the
Master Contract — which provides that the terms of that Contract
(including Article V, which obligates the Board to pay the cost
of health insurance coverage for part-time teachers, Record on
Appeal ("R.") 208), are to supersede any conflicting Board
policies (including Policy GCDA, which provides that part-time
teachers "will not be eligible for health . . . insurance
coverage,"

R. 109) —

is invalid as "an unlawful limitation on

2.
the Board's legislative authority."

R. 274.

In its responding

brief ("Board Br."), the Board makes three specific
counterarguments.

As we now show, however, none of these

counterarguments has any merit.
A.

The Board's Argument That "The Board May
Not Be Precluded from Adopting or Amending
Its Policies" (Board Br. 12-26)

We argued in our opening brief that the trial court's
holding that the Board could not lawfully agree that the terms of
the Master Contract would prevail over unilaterally adopted Board
policies "in effect denies school boards the authority to enter
into any binding contract."

PCEA Br. 13 (emphasis in original).

The Board makes no attempt to rebut this argument, but instead
validates it by contending that any restriction on "the ability
of the Board to at all times adopt, amend or rescind its
policies," Board Br. 16, would be "an unlawful limitation on the
Board's legislative authority."

Id. at 12.

It follows from this

contention that the Board can at any time unilaterally alter the
terms of any contract that it has entered into, and this
necessarily would be true whether the Board's contracting partner
was a vendor supplying goods, an individual employee agreeing to
provide services, or a union negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement.

We demonstrated in our opening brief why this result

3.
is directly contrary both to the statutes of this State (which
expressly grant contracting authority to school boards), PCEA Br.
13-14, and to the basic concept of a contract, id. at 13. 1

We

will not at this juncture reiterate the arguments made in our
opening brief, and by way of supplementation simply would note
the patent incompatibility between the Board's argument that its
ability to adopt, amend or rescind its employment policies cannot
be "restricted by agreement with private entities," Board Br. 14,
and its subsequent argument that "Utah Law Allows Individuals to
Contract Directly with Their Employer," jLd. at 26, and that Ms.
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden "cannot now claim that those
[individual employment] contracts are unenforceable."

Id. at

27. 2

1

By definition, a contract creates obligations for both
contracting parties. As the United States Supreme Court has
explained: "A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or
change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity." United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 n.23 (1977)
(quoting Murray v. Charleston. 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)). See
also Perry v. United States. 294 U.S. 330, 351 n.3 (1935) ("[i]t
is in theory impossible to reconcile the idea of a promise which
obliges, with a power to make a law which can vary the effect of
it") .
2

In challenging the validity of section 2.3 of the Master
Contract the Board states that because "this contractual
provision would prevent the Board from amending its policies
regarding benefits, compensation, personnel, termination and many
other essential matters," it "would be an unlawful limitation on
the Board's legislative authority." Board Br. 12 (emphasis
added). The Board's contention that it has a nonbargainable
right unilaterally to alter policies regarding "termination" is
belied by its citation, see id. at 20 n.2, of UCA § 53A-8-103(1),
which provides in relevant part:

4.
While repeatedly reciting that the Board "cannot be
precluded from amending its policies, adopting additional
policies, or rescinding existing policies," e.g., id. at 12, the
Board fails to focus on the specific circumstances in which the
Utah courts have found an unlawful delegation.

As we and the

Board apparently agree, the leading case is Salt Lake City v.
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
In that case, the legislature had provided that when
municipalities and firefighter associations were unable to agree
in negotiations on the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, all unresolved issues would be submitted to a panel of
arbitrators which would decide what the terms of the agreement
would be.

Thus, it was the arbitrators who would actually make

the final decisions about government policy with respect to those
issues.

The question raised by these facts was whether the

legislature could "delegate unlimited discretion to an ad hoc
panel of private persons to make basic governmental policy."
at 789.

The Utah Supreme Court answered that question in the

negative.

A local school board shall, by contract with its
educators or their associations or by resolution of the
board, establish procedures for dismissal [i.e.,
termination] of educators . . . .
(Emphasis added.)

Id.

5.
The Board draws from Salt Lake City the conclusion that
section 2.3 of the Master Contract is unlawful —

not because it

delegates decisionmaking responsibility to an arbitration panel
or some other private entity —

but because it constitutes "an

absolute surrender of the Board's legislatively delegated
authority to govern its affairs through the enactment, amendment
and recision of its policies."

Board Br. 14. But section 2.3

—

which comes into play only after the parties have voluntarily
reached a complete agreement on the terms and conditions of
employment and which simply obligates the Board to comply with
that agreement —

can be characterized as "an [unlawful] absolute

surrender" of the Board's authority only if we accept the
previously discredited proposition that school boards lack the
authority to enter into any binding contract.
Nothing in the Salt Lake City decision supports such a
characterization, and the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized the critical distinction between a provision that
permits an arbitrator to substitute his or her judgment for that
of a governmental entity in establishing the terms and conditions
of public employment in the first instance (as in Salt Lake City)
and a provision that obligates a governmental entity to comply
with an already existing, voluntarily negotiated contract.

In

Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah
1981), the court rejected a municipality's attempt to invalidate
the arbitration clause contained in a construction contract it
had agreed to.

Holding that the municipality's authority to

6.
contract gave it the power to submit to arbitration any
contractual claim asserted by or against it, the court noted that
the arbitration clause
applied only to disputes about compliance with terms
fixed by the contract. Such a clause was not an
abdication of the municipalityfs duties towards new
matters which might arise in the future, but only
constituted a present agreement that disputes which
might arise under the contract would be arbitrated.
Id. at 1075.

In contrast to the Salt Lake City case, the court

concluded that these facts "did not involve a delegation of
unlimited discretion to an ad hoc panel of private persons to
make basic governmental policy."

Id. at 1075 & n.21.

If a governmental entity does not unlawfully delegate its
legislative authority by agreeing to arbitrate disputes that
arise out of a contract it has agreed to, then, a fortiori, the
agreement to be bound by the terms of the underlying contract
itself cannot constitute an unlawful delegation (or, in the
Board's words, "an absolute surrender") of the governmental
entity's authority.

Under the Board's view that "no agreement

can lawfully supersede the Board's authority and duty to act,"
Board Br. 13, not only the arbitration clause in Lindon City, but
also the underlying contract itself, would have been an unlawful
delegation.

What the Board overlooks is that one way in which a

governmental entity "acts" is by contract, and Lindon City makes
clear that in binding itself contractually a governmental entity
does not unlawfully delegate its authority.

7.
The Board's apparent failure to grasp the critical
distinction between making a contract and being bound by a
contract once it is made is further evidenced by its attempt to
distinguish two cases relied upon by PCEA in its opening brief

—

Littleton Education Ass'n v. Arapahoe County School District, 553
P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976), and Louisiana Teachers Ass'n v. Orleans
Parish School Bd.f 303 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1974).

See Board

Br. 21-24.
With respect to the negotiation of future contracts, the
collective bargaining agreement in Littleton established a
procedure under which the school board retained the ultimate
decisionmaking authority with regard to any issues upon which the
parties were unable to agree.

See 553 P.2d at 796.

It was in

that respect that the Littleton agreement differed from the city
ordinance at issue in Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 553
P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976).

The latter ordinance, which was struck

down by the Colorado Supreme Court as an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority on the same day that the court sustained
the agreement in Littleton, provided that in case of an impasse
in negotiations the unresolved issues would be submitted to
binding arbitration.
The Master Contract in this case contains no provisions for
the resolution of impasses in the negotiation of future
contracts; the terms of any such contracts are to be determined
by the parties through voluntary negotiations.

It is, therefore,

entirely within the Board's discretion whether or not it will

8.
agree to any particular term.

As in Littleton,

fl

[n]egotations

between an employer and an employee organization entered into
voluntarily, as in this case, do not require the employer to
agree with the proposals submitted by employees."
796.

553 P.2d at

Here, no less than in Littleton, the Board "retain[s] its

legislatively delegated authority to make the final decision in
matters so important to its operation," Board Br. 22-23, by
deciding whether or not to bind itself contractually to any
particular term.

Once a contract has been concluded, on the

other hand, it is binding on the parties that signed it —

in

Littleton just as in this case.3
The Board's attempt to distinguish Louisiana Teachers'
Ass'n, see Board Br. 24, likewise is misguided.

The court held

in that case that requiring a school board to comply with a
collective bargaining agreement was not an unlawful delegation of
the school board's authority because the school board "retains
the right of final decision as to what terms and conditions it
will agree to.

Indeed, it retains the right to decide not to

agree at all."

303 So. 2d at 568.

That is precisely the

situation that obtains here.

3

As the Board observes at another point in its brief, under UCA
§§ 53A-3-411(l) and 53A-8-103(l) a school board retains the
authority to decide to contract only individually with its
educators (or other employees), rather than engaging in
collective bargaining. Board Br. 2 0 n.2. That is a correct, but
irrelevant observation. Once a school board has chosen to
conclude a collective bargaining agreement, it cannot avoid the
contract it has made on the ground that it could have chosen a
different option.

9.
Nor do any of the out-of-state cases on which the Board
relies, see Board Br. 16-2 0, advance its cause.

First, the Board

cites several California cases for the proposition that "[a]
school board cannot bar itself or future boards from adopting
subsequent resolutions which may alter earlier established
policies."

Id. at 16.

But to the extent that statement is meant

to suggest that a school board may not enter into a contract that
limits its future freedom of action, it goes well beyond the
teaching of the cited cases.4
People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr.
640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), and City & County of San Francisco v.
Patterson, 248 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), both
invalidated statutory initiatives that sought to limit the
ability of legislative bodies to enact certain legislation.
Holding that such a limitation could be imposed only by
constitutional or charter amendment, the court observed that a
legislative body may not, "by normal legislative enactment, . . .
divest itself or future boards of the power to enact legislation

4

The Board also cites Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 86-40 (Aug. 11,
1986), for the proposition that "a board is free to modify or
repeal policies adopted by prior boards." Board Br. 16. The
cited opinion does state that a board may "amend or rescind [a]
rule or policy adopted by the prior board," Op. No. 86-40
(emphasis added), but it does not suggest that a board may simply
disregard a contract entered into by a prior board. And the
Attorney General has made clear in another opinion that a school
board may not do so: "If the Board has previously exercised
[its] discretion in a duly negotiated agreement . . . , then the
Board should abide [by] the terms of the agreement for its
duration." Utah Attfy Gen. Op. No. 85-73 (Mar. 11, 1986).

10.
within its competence."
at 296.

226 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47; 248 Cal. Rptr.

The Board's attempt to extend that principle to bar a

governmental agency from binding itself by contract proves far
too much, for it would preclude a school board (or other
governmental entity) from entering into any contract.

That is

not the law in California or in Utah.
Nor does City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 534 P.2d
403 (Cal. 1975), which does present a factual situation somewhat
closer to the case at bar, support the Board's position,,

The

court's holding in Cooper was that the school board's adoption of
a resolution governing the terms of employment, which precluded
changes in those terms without the assent of the "employee
council," was in violation of the specific statutory scheme that
then governed public school employment in California.
P.2d at 423.

See 534

Under that statute, the Winton Act, collective

bargaining between school boards and employee representatives was
not permitted.5

5

The objectionable language was thus not part of

The Winton Act provided that representatives of school boards
and a "council" of their employees should "meet and confer" over,
inter alia, the terms and conditions of employment, with the
objective of reaching agreement on recommendations that would be
submitted to the school board. See 534 P.2d at 421-22. The
school board and the employee council were not permitted under
the Winton Act to conclude a binding written contract; only a
resolution of the board adopting the "meet and confer"
recommendations was of legal force. Id. at 421-23 (citing Grasko
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1973)). In short, collective bargaining between school
boards and employee representatives was not allowed. In 1975,
the Winton Act was replaced by the Educational Employment
Relations (Rodda) Act, under which school boards are required to

11.
a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract.

Rather,

it was contained in a resolution adopted by the school board.
The court's holding that "a school board cannot, by resolution,
bar itself or future boards from adopting subsequent resolutions
which may alter earlier established policies," id. (emphasis
added), says nothing about the ability of a school board to bind
itself to the terms of a contract, where —
Utah —

collective bargaining JLS permitted.6

as is the case in
And, as we have

already shown, collective bargaining would be illusory if a
school board could not enter into a legally binding and
enforceable contract.
Finally, the Board cites several cases from other
jurisdictions in which specific substantive provisions of
collective bargaining agreements were held to constitute
impermissible delegations of a school board's legislative
authority.

In Mindemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 111

P.2d 996 (Okla. 1989), the court held that a school board could

bargain collectively with the majority representatives of their
employees. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3540 et seq.
6

Indeed, the Cooper court made clear that, even though a school
board could not engage in collective bargaining under the Winton
Act, it could conclude other contracts (such as individual
contracts of employment with its teachers), and the terms of
those contracts would limit the board's freedom to act by
resolution. See 534 P.2d at 424 n.18. Thus, it is clear that,
in holding that a board could not "by resolution" limit its
freedom to change its policies in the future, the court did not
intend to foreclose the board from entering into contracts — to
the extent that it was legally authorized to do so — that would
have the effect of placing limits on its ability to change its
policies at will.

12.
not be required to submit to arbitration, pursuant to a grievance
procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, its decision not
to reemploy a probationary teacher and to discontinue coaching
assignments of tenured teachers.

In Raines v. Independent School

Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303 (Okla. 1990), the court relied upon
Mindemann in holding that a school board's decision to reprimand
a teacher could not be submitted to arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement.

In neither case, however, did

the Oklahoma court hold that the arbitration of contractual
grievances is per se unlawful, or that a school board cannot as a
general matter be required to comply with obligations agreed to
in a collective bargaining agreement.

In both cases, the

decision was bottomed on the fact that the specific substantive
issues that the union sought to submit to arbitration involved
decisions which by statute were expressly reserved to unilateral
school board action.

As the court put it in Mindemann, "a local

board of education may [not] voluntarily enter into a collective
bargaining agreement providing for binding arbitration" of school
board decisions regarding substantive matters "which are
statutorily vested in the exclusive authority and discretion of
the school board."

7

771 P.2d at 9 99.7

Even if Mindemann or Raines could be read more broadly -— for
the proposition that a school board may, and indeed must,,
repudiate a contractual agreement with a union to submit disputes
about the meaning or application of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to arbitration — they would be contrary to
the overwhelming weight of judicial authority. Thus, at least
the following jurisdictions allow a public employer to

13.
In Miller v. Board of Education, Unified School Dist. No.
470, 744 P.2d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987), aff f d on other grounds,
752 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1988), the court invalidated a collective
bargaining agreement provision governing teacher dismissal that

voluntarily agree to submit to binding grievance arbitration
contractual disputes that do not involve a decision that is by
statute expressly reserved to the employer: Lake Wash. School
Dist. No. 414 v. Lake Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 745 P.2d 504 (Wash.
1987), modified, 757 P.2d 533 (Wash. 1988); Local Division No.
812 v. Central W. Va. Transit Auth., 365 S.E.2d 76 (W.Va. 1987);
Paranko v. State, 509 A.2d 508 (Conn. 1986); Board of Educ. v.
Bremen Dist. No. 228 Joint Faculty Ass'n, 461 N.E.2d 406 (111.
1984) ; Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n,
343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1983); City & County of Denver v. Denver
Firefighters Local No. 858, 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983); Cape
Elizabeth School Bd. v. Cape Elizabeth Teachers Ass'n, 459 A.2d
166 (Me. 1983); Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Lodge No. 97
Fraternal Order of Police, 330 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. 1982); Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 397 N.E.2d 350
(N.Y. 1979); Woodstock Union High School Bd. v. Woodstock Union
High School Teachers' Org., 388 A.2d 392 (Vt. 1978); State v.
Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. 1977); West Fargo Pub. School
Dist. No. 6 v. West Fargo Educ. Ass'n, 259 N.W.2d 612 (N.D.
1977); Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 346 A.2d
35 (Pa. 1975) ; Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd., 323
N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1975); Richards v. Board of E d u c , 206 N.W.2d
597 (Wis. 1973); Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v.
Evansville Teachers Ass'n, 494 N.E.2d 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Worcester v. Borghesi, 477 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. Ct. App. 1985);
Howard County Bd. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n, Inc., 487 A.2d
1220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); City of Pompano Beach v. Meiroff,
410 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982). In City & County of Denver,
the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the difference between
grievance arbitration (at issue in these cases) and interest
arbitration (at issue in the Salt Lake City and Greeley Police
Union cases):
Binding interest arbitration allows the arbitrator to
substitute his judgment for that of public officials on
matters the electorate has entrusted to its elected
representatives. . . . Grievance arbitration, on the
other hand, arises only after the parties have reached
complete agreement on terms and conditions of
employment.
663 P.2d at 1037-38.

14.
deviated from statutory provisions on that subject.

The court's

reasoning was that a contractual provision violating "specific
statutory terms" was void.

Id. at 868.

Its holding, cited by

the Board, that a "municipal corporation cannot in any manner
bind itself by any contract which is beyond the scope of its
powers," id. at 869, is simply of no relevance here, as the
ability to contract with its employees concerning the provision
of health insurance is clearly within a school board's powers.8
B.

The Board's Argument That "Utah Law Allows
Individuals to Contract Directly With Their
Employer Regardless of Existing Collective
Bargaining Agreements" (Board Br. 26-28)

After contending in Part A of its brief that any contract
that restricts "the ability of the Board to at all times adopt,
amend or rescind its [employment] policies," Board Br. 16, would
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, the
Board now argues that Utah law allows the Board to enter into
individual employment contracts with its employees, and that Ms.
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden "cannot now claim that [their

8

It is not our position, as the Board suggests, Board Br. 21, 25,
that any contract, whatever its terms, is within the Board's
power or immune from challenge as an unlawful delegation.
(Indeed, the severance clause contained in paragraph 2.1 of the
Master Contract recognizes that certain contractual provisions
could be invalid.) Our point is simply that agreeing to be bound
by the terms of a contract is not per se an unlawful delegation
of authority. There has been no suggestion in this case that
either the subject matter of the Master Contract — the terms and
conditions of teachers' employment, including specifically
provisions for health insurance coverage — or its two-year
duration was beyond the contracting authority granted to the
Board by UCA § 53A-3-411(1).

15.
individual employment] contracts are unenforceable.11

Id. at 27.

As we now show, this patent inconsistency with its prior argument
is by no means the only defect in the Board's present argument.
The Board begins this section of its brief by misstating the
position of PCEA.

Contrary to the Boardfs assertion, PCEA does

not contend "that the Board is prohibited from negotiating
directly with the Association's individual members," id. at 26,
and indeed, the Master Contract itself expressly contemplates
that it will be supplemented by an individual employment contract
for each teacher.

R. 201 (f 2.2). 9

What the Board apparently

means, in contending that "Utah Law Allows Individuals to
Contract Directly with Their Employer Regardless of Existing
Collective Bargaining Agreements," Board Br. 26 (emphasis added),
is that after contractually binding itself to provide certain
benefits to all members of the bargaining unit, it may still
enter into individual contracts that deny those benefits or that
otherwise conflict with its contractual obligations under the
Master Contract.10

Thus, the question here is not simply, as the

9

Nor is that unusual: even where an employer is required by law
to bargain collectively with the majority representative of its
employees — as, for example, under the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") — a collective bargaining agreement may "leave
certain areas open to individual bargaining." J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
10

Without citation to anything in the record, the Board asserts
in its brief that Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signed their
individual contracts "[w]hile the [Master] contract was under
renegotiation" in the fall of 1989. Board Br. 27. What the
record in fact shows is that the Master Contract was a two-year
agreement, executed on September 21, 1988, R. 200, to cover the

16.
Board puts it, whether employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement can "contract directly with their employer."
Board Br. 26.

Clearly they can, at least to the extent those

individual contracts are not inconsistent with the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement.

The question rather is

whether the Board may, as a condition of employment, require
employees already covered by a collective bargaining agreement to
accept separate, individual contracts on terms inferior to those
of the collective bargaining agreement.11

To state the question

school years 1988-89 and 1989-90. R. 197, 201 (5 2.2). Pursuant
to a limited reopener, the Board and PCEA conducted negotiations
during the fall of 1989 over certain specific provisions of the
contract, including notably the $197 per month ceiling on health
insurance coverage contained in paragraph 5.1.2 of the Master
Contract. See R. 239. After the conclusion of those
negotiations in late October, id., Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden
signed their 1989-90 individual employment contracts in December
1989. R. Ill, 113. Notwithstanding the 1989 negotiations,
during which the parties voluntarily agreed to certain
contractual amendments, the provisions of the Master Contract —
including specifically the requirement that the Board provide
health insurance coverage to all members of the bargaining unit,
including part-time teachers — remained in full force and
effect.
11

It seems evident that no employee would agree to a separate
contract that provided fewer benefits than the collective
bargaining agreement with nothing in return — unless her
employer required her to do so in order to obtain or retain her
employment. Even accepting arguendo the Boardfs view that the
contracts signed by Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden took them
outside the coverage of the Master Contract — a point we
vigorously dispute, as these two teachers did no more than sign
the same individual employment contracts as were foreseen in the
Master Contract and were presumably signed by every other member
of the bargaining unit — the Board has provided no evidence
whatever (not to mention evidence sufficient to prevail on a
motion for summary judgment) to support its counterintuitive
assertion that Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden voluntarily chose to
opt out of the collective bargaining agreement and instead make
separate — and less advantageous — deals with the Board. The

17.
is to answer it.

A collective bargaining agreement would have no

meaning if an employer could evade its terms by the simple
expedient of requiring individual employees, in order to obtain
or retain their positions, to agree to accept less compensation,
fewer benefits, or poorer working conditions than required by the
collective bargaining agreement, and collective bargaining would,
in turn, be illusory.

Accordingly, if it is permissible for a

school board to engage in collective bargaining with its
employees —

and we show elsewhere that it is, see PCEA Br. 19-

23; infra Part C —

then the rule espoused by the Board must be

rejected.12

only evidence in the record of the two teachers' subjective
intent with respect to their individual employment contracts
suggests that they assented to such separate contracts only
because they were required to do so in order to obtain their
teaching positions for the 1989-90 school year. Thus, Ms. Hadden
signed her contract under protest. See R. 113, 140. Moreover,
as Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden were presumably aware that the
Master Contract clause entitling them to full health insurance
coverage was deemed incorporated into their individual contracts,
R. 201 (5 2.2), their assent to those contracts cannot be seen as
an acceptance of lower benefits than they were entitled to under
the Master Contract or as a waiver of their right to challenge
the Boardfs announced intent to deny them the benefits of the
Master Contract.
12

There may be a somewhat closer question as to whether an
employer that is bound by a collective bargaining agreement may
negotiate separate agreements with individual employees that are
more advantageous to the employee than (or simply different from)
the collective bargaining agreement, and where the employee's
decision to opt for such a separate contract, rather than
remaining under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
is purely voluntary. While this Court need not confront that
issue in order to decide the case before it, we think it clear
that even that question must, consistent with the concept of
collective bargaining and exclusive representation, be answered
in the negative. Certainly that is the answer the federal courts
have given with respect to collective bargaining under the NLRA.

18.
In support of its assertion that the Board may avoid its
contractual obligations by negotiating conflicting individual
contracts, the Board relies almost entirely on UCA § 34-20-7.13

In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967), the
Supreme Court explained that collective bargaining
extinguishes the individual employee's power to order
his own relations with his employer and creates a power
vested in the chosen representative to act in the
interests of all employees. . . . Thus only the union
may contract the employee's terms and conditions of
employment . . . .
Similarly, Utah's Labor Relations Act, modeled after the NLRA,
provides that representatives designated by the majority of
employees "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in that unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, cind of
other conditions of employment," UCA § 34-20-9(1)(a) (emphasis
added), while "individual employee[s]" are granted only the right
to "present grievances to their employer at any time." UCA § 3420-9(1)(b). Of course, neither the NLRA nor its Utah analogue
applies to school districts. As far as collective bargaining is
concerned, that means principally that the employer cannot be
compelled to bargain collectively. But once a school board has
opted to deal with its employees by means of a collective
bargaining agreement rather than through individual contracts —
as it may under Utah law, see PCEA Br. 19-23; infra Part C — the
effect of such a collective bargaining agreement should logically
be the same.
13

The Board also cites two Attorney General opinions, Utah Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 85-73 (Mar. 11, 1986), and Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No.
88-002 (June 13, 1988), in support of its position, Board Br. 2728, but neither says anything on point. Both opinions merely
emphasize that under Utah's right-to-work law, UCA §§ 34-34-1 et
sea., collective bargaining may not "infringe on an individual's
right to work or communicate directly with his employer." Op.
No. 85-73. That is a far cry from saying, as does the Board,
that an individual has a "right to contract with an employer
despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement."
Board Br. 27. As to the requirements of the right-to-work law
itself — which explicitly preserves the right of employees to
bargain collectively, UCA § 34-34-16 — there is nothing in the
Master Contract that requires union membership or the payment of
union dues or fees as a condition of employment, or that is
otherwise contrary to the right-to-work law.

19.
That provision, which is part of Utah's Labor Relations Act,
provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such
employees shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities.
The Board's reliance on § 34-20-7 is misplaced for two reasons.
In the first place, the Utah Labor Relations Act simply does
not apply to public-sector employment.

Section 34-20-2(5)(b) of

that Act defines an "employer" subject to the Act to exclude "a
state or political subdivision of a state."

A school district,

as a political subdivision of the state, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571
P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1977), is thus excluded from the coverage of
the Labor Relations Act generally and of UCA § 34-20-7
specifically.

See also Westlv v. Board of City Commissioners,

573 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Utah 1978) (per curiam) ("In the absence of
explicit legislative language, statutes governing labor relations
between employers and employees apply only to private industry
and not to the sovereign or its political subdivisions.").14

14

Oddly enough, just three pages after relying on § 34-20-7 in an
attempt to demonstrate that public employees have the right to
bargain individually with their employers, the Board cites Westly
for the just-quoted proposition that, absent "explicit
legislative language," labor relations statutes have no
application to public employment. See Board Br. 29. (The Labor
Relations Act does, to be sure, contain explicit language — but
it explicitly excludes public-sector employment from its
coverage.) One is thus left with some uncertainty as to whether
the Board believes the Labor Relations Act applies to it. If

20.
Moreover, the Board's interpretation of § 34-20-7 is
defective even when judged on its own terms.

That interpretation

is inconsistent with the rest of the Labor Relations act, which
—

as we have already seen, supra n.12 —

provides for exclusive

representation of all employees by the designated majority
representative with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment, UCA § 34-20-9(1)(a), and leaves individual employees
only the right to "present grievances to their employer at any
time."

UCA § 34-20-9(1)(b).

Thus, it cannot be the Act's intent

to allow individual employees "to contract with an employer
despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement,"
Board Br. 27 —

at least not to the extent that any such

individual agreement is contrary to the terms of the governing
collective agreement.
The same conclusion is compelled for another reason.
Section 34-20-7 is taken virtually verbatim from § 7 of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 157, 15 and in interpreting that statute the courts
have firmly rejected the construction the Board urges here.

See

NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (quoted

that Act did cover school districts, of course, the Board would
be required to bargain collectively with the majority
representative of its employees, UCA § 34-20-8(1)(d), and indeed
the guarantee in UCA § 34-20-7 of the right "to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection" would afford the school
district's employees the right to strike. Perhaps this explains
the Board's ambivalence as to whether the Act applies to it.
15

The only substantive difference between § 7 and § 34-2 0-7 is
the inclusion in the former of an additional proviso concerning
union membership agreements, a matter not at issue here.

21.
supra n.12); J.I. Case Co, v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-39
(1944). 16

Thus, even if § 34-20-7 applied to school districts —

which it does not —

it would not allow the Board to enter into

an individual contract with an employee that conflicted with the
collective bargaining agreement covering that employee.
In short, nothing in the Board's argument supports its
contention that the individual employment contracts signed by Ms.
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden excused the Board from complying with
its obligation under the Master Contract to provide them with
health insurance coverage.
C.

The Board's Argument That "The Right of Public
Employees to Bargain Collectively is Not at Issue in
this Case," but if it were, School Boards Do Not Have
Authority to Enter Into Collective Bargaining
Agreements with Unions Representing Their Employees
•(Board Br. 29-30)

Although maintaining that "[t]he Court should not and need
not decide whether collective bargaining is appropriate for
public employees in order to address the issue presented," Board
Br. 29, 1 7 the Board, presumably in the interest of completeness,
argues that this question should be answered in the negative.

In

16

In construing those provisions of Utah's Labor Relations Act
that are derived from the NLRA, Utah courts will consider the
interpretation given the parallel NLRA provisions by the federal
courts. Southeast Furniture Co. v. Industrial Commission, 100
Utah 154, 156, 111 P.2d 153, 153-54 (1941).
17

The Board is mistaken in this regard. As we have shown, the
lower court's decision precludes meaningful collective bargaining
between the Board and PCEA, inasmuch as the Board could not enter
into a legally binding collective bargaining agreement.

22.
support of its position, the Board cites Westly v. Board of City
Commissioners, 573 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1978) (per curiam); Pratt v.
Citv Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981); and Local 2238 AFSCME v.
Stratton, 769 P.2d 76 (N.M. 1989).

We already have discussed

Westly and Pratt, see PCEA Br. 21 n.15, and will not burden the
Court with a reiteration here.

A brief comment is appropriate,

however, with regard to Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton.

In this

case, the New Mexico court in fact rejected the rule for which
the Board cites the case (that express statutory authority is
required for collective bargaining), and held instead that
"collective bargaining by public employees in New Mexico is legal
even without a statute explicitly addressing that subject."
P.2d at 77 (emphasis added).

769

The court reasoned that New Mexico

statutes provided sufficient implicit authority for such
bargaining:
[I]f a power is granted expressly to a public body to
do a certain act, but no specific mode or manner of
exercising the power is prescribed, the public body in
its discretion may chose a reasonable method to
exercise the power expressly granted. . . . For
example, if the power to bargain collectively has not
been granted to the state agencies, but instead, the
power to contract has, then the means to bargain
collectively may be implied from the general power to
contract in order to exercise that power effectively.
Id. at 81.
This reasoning is fully consistent with the standards
applied by Utah courts in construing the powers of local
political units.

In State v, Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah

1980), the Utah Supreme Court abolished the previously applied

23.
"Dillon's Rule" of strictly construing grants of authority to
local political subdivisions.

Henceforth, the court said,

the courts will not interfere with the legislative
choice of the means selected [to implement an
authorized objective] unless it is arbitrary, or is
directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the
policy of, the state or federal laws or the
constitution of this State or of the United States.
Id. at 1126.

See also id. at 1127 (Dillon's Rule should no

longer be used to prevent local political units "from using
reasonable means to implement specific grants of authority").
The Board's contention that school districts cannot engage in
collective bargaining without "express statutory authority,"
Board Br. 30, belongs to an earlier era.

Under the reasoning of

Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton and State v. Hutchinson, the
Board's concession that UCA § 53A-3-411(l) grants school boards
the power to contract "with no restriction as to with whom the
contract may be entered," Board Br. 2 0 n.2, should be dispositive
of this issue.
Finally, the Board contends that PCEA's "extensive
references to legislation adopted in the 1993 [Utah] Legislative
Session is not relevant [because] [t]he law applicable is the law
in existence at the time the case was decided in the Circuit
Court."

18

Id. at 30. 1 8

The Board misses the point.

The cited

Presumably the applicable law is the law at the time of the
events on which the litigation is based. In any event, however,
there are no relevant differences in the law at the time of those
events, the time of the circuit court's decision, and the present
time.

24.
statutes, see PCEA Br. 21-22, do not create the authority of
school boards to bargain collectively, but they clearly assume
(and are indeed predicated upon) the existence of such authority,
They are, therefore, evidence of the Legislature's understanding
of the law that was already in existence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in PCEA's opening brief,
the judgment of the trial court dismissing PCEA's complaint
should be reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court
with instructions to deny the Board's motion for summary
judgment, grant PCEA's motion for summary judgment, and enter
judgment in favor of PCEA.
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